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 S T A T E M E N T OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping, both first degree felonies. J .vsLourt r.u- .ur^ukijon .u.oor i.ie pour-
over provision c*i L -_:I •_ - : \ \ --i'j s - - : • '^er i lc '). 
1. Did the trial court plainly err \\ hen it did r:< sua sponte enter a directed 
verdict? 
Standard :.j Kci'idc. " I o show that plain error occurred ::*; Lne ccr,te\i . 1 a 
challenge to the. >ulTiGierKT '^ ibf? ',J,» ideive. an appellant must <;h«>\v 'fir^t fhaf i!i.» 
,
 hi„ - -,, ,Vc^ T^.-f^rj^rif-ro -.Mpoorta conviction of the crime[s] charged and second 
that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2.002 UT App 288, \ 32, 55 R3d 1131 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10 R3d 346). 
2. Was counsel ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict? 
Standard of Review. "' An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law/" which the appellate court 
"review[s] for correctness/' State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, \ 10,169 P.3d 806 
(quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, | 6, 89 P.3d 162). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West Supp. 2008) (definitions) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008) (aggravated kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004) (robbery) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings below. The State charged Defendant and co-defendant, Brandon 
Morris, jointly with one count each of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008). 
R4-5. At a joint jury trial, both Defendant and Morris were convicted as charged. 
R40-41; see also State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 174U. The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of five years to life on the 
2 
aecravated robbery count and fifteen years to life on the aggravated kidnapping 
count. R11M3. 
Proceedin.gs on appeal. Co-defendant Morris appealed his conviction and 
was represented on appeal by appellate counsel, Randall \ \ . i ^h^ i u-. :vi r>tate v. 
Morris, Case N o. 20080551 -C \ IV Ion is clain ted both that tl t,e trie il co in 1 • plaii i ly 
erred ID y failing to sua sponte order a directed verdict and tl !,atl i i s trial • : :)uii sel \ * i LS 
ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. See 
id. In a decision filed June 25, 2009, this Court affirmed Morris's convictions. 
Morris, 2009 UT App 174U. The Court rejected both of Morris's claims, holding that 
the evidence was suttkient to survive a directed \ eiv*ict irk;;ion. >cc in. . i * .. 




 J> " i A V v - ; ; 1 • ••-v.dr.n!: c:\od her brief ui appellant, making the same ciamis that 
Morris made on appeal. Defendant's claims, facts, and arguments are an almost 
verbatim reproduction of those set forth in Morris's brief and rejected by this Court 
in iviorris s case. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
John Barlow met Defendant in mid-July 2007. R134:163.2 Their relationship 
became intimate, and they lived together for a few days. R134:165-66. After Barlow 
moved out, they continued to send text messages to one another. R134:166. 
On September 8, 2007, Defendant sent Barlow a text message, and they 
decided to spend the afternoon together, driving up Ogden Canyon, looping over to 
Park City and down through Provo Canyon, and finally traveling up to a barbecue 
in Sandy. R134:167. Defendant proposed that they meet at the Timbermine 
Restaurant at the mouth of Ogden Canyon. R134:167-68. 
Barlow, driving a van, met Defendant outside the restaurant. R134:170. He 
was surprised to find that Defendant had brought along another individual, 
Brandon Morris, whom she introduced as her cousin. Rl 34:171-72. Defendant said 
that her cousin needed a ride up to Huntsville. R134:172. She suggested that they 
travel in her car. R134:173. 
1
"When reviewing a jury verdict, [the appellate court} recite[s] the facts in the 
light most favorable to that verdict." State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, | 3,144 P.3d 1152. 
2
 Although the pleadings file in this case includes document pages numbered 
from 1 to 159, the transcripts (which were prepared for State v. Morris, Case No. 
20080551) have not been given new numbers for this case. They are numbered 133-
37. When the State references the transcripts, it uses this format: R133:ll-12. When 
it references the pleadings file it uses this format: R133 or R133-35. 
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Barlow, however, offered to drive his van, and Defendant agreed. R134:174. 
As Barlow started to climb inside the van, he felt a hand on his shoulder and a sharp 
point in his back. Id. Morris said to him, "One wrong move, you're going to get this 
jammed up in you/' R134:175. Morris had a knife in his hand. R134:176. 
Morris opened the passenger door lock for Defendant and told Barlow to give 
him his keys, wallet, and phone. Id. Barlow gave the keys and wallet to Morris. Id. 
Defendant, holding a pipe wrench in her hand, asked for the cell phone, and Barlow 
gave it to her. R134:176-77. Morris had Barlow sit on a metal folding chair between 
the driver's and passenger's seats. R134:175. Morris, claiming to be an undercover 
police officer, read Barlow his rights. R134:176. Defendant referred to Morris as 
"Sarge." R134:177-78. 
Steering with his left hand and holding the knife to Barlow's back with his 
right hand, Morris drove up Ogden Canyon. R134:177-78. While traveling, 
Defendant and Morris threatened Barlow. R134:180. As they traveled, Defendant 
and Morris talked about taking Barlow "to the [police] station" in Huntsville. 
R134:179. They made some comments about Barlow having sexually assaulted 
Defendant's cousin. Id. Barlow asked that they take him to the police station, but 
they did not. R134:180. 
After arriving in Huntsville, Defendant and Morris took the road going north 
on the east side of the reservoir, then drove east on 9500 or 9800 East to where it 
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connected with State Road 39. R134:181. At that juncture, Defendant threw 
Barlow's cell phone out the window. Id. At approximately mile marker 33.2, they 
turned onto a dirt road and proceeded another 100 to 120 yards. R134:183. During 
the drive, Defendant had tied Barlow's hands with a "hoody string." R134:185. 
Defendant and Morris stopped, ordered Barlow out of the car, and had him 
walk twenty feet or so into the woods. R134:183-84. Barlow, hands still tied, 
complied. R134:184. Morris followed him; Defendant stood by the van. Id. Morris 
took a roll of soldering wire and tied Barlow to a tree. R134:185. Defendant and 
Morris then jumped into the van and drove off. R134:187-88. Almost immediately, 
Barlow heard a loud bang. R134:188. 
After only a couple of minutes, Barlow loosed himself from the tree and ran 
down the canyon. R134:188~89. Running down the road, he saw where a large 
boulder had been ripped out of the dirt road and had been dragged ten to fifteen 
feet. R134:189. Transmission fluid was all over the place. Id. The fluid led back to 
State Road 39, where Barlow saw the van "kind of banked off the side of the road." 
Id. He could see Defendant and Morris farther down the road, climbing into a white 
Ford pickup. R134:190. 
Barlow later flagged down a Suburban on State Road 39. R134:191-92. The 
occupants offered to contact the county sheriffs office as soon as they had cell 
phone service. R134:192. A deputy arrived within twenty minutes. Id. Barlow told 
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him what had happened and showed the deputy "probably close to 20 pretty good-
sized scratch marks" and "a couple of puncture marks which were deeper than 
scratches" that had been made by the knife. R134:212. The detective also saw red 
lines on Barlow's wrists that were "consistent with soldering wire" and red stripes 
all the way around his wrists. R134:213. 
Barlow pointed the deputy to an empty solder roll. R134:192. Barlow and the 
deputy located Barlow's cell phone at the corner of 9500 East and State Road 39. 
R134:193. Barlow's wallet was later found and returned. R134:194. Only his cash 
was missing. Id. 
Detective Dewain Sorenson subsequently took Defendant into custody. 
R135:77. Defendant claimed that she had gone camping with Morris, her cousin 
Sierra, and a "hippy girl" named Lennie. R135:70. She later stated that another 
male was with them, but that she did not know his name. Id. She then claimed that 
this male, Barlow, sexually assaulted her, that she telephoned Morris, and that 
Morris came and saved her. R135:72. Detective Sorenson found her claimed 
telephone call "implausible," because there is no cell phone service in the area 
where the alleged assault occurred. R135:72. Moreover, the details of her account 
"didn't make sense." Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence sufficed to show robbery and aggravated robbery. Defendant 
held a pipe wrench in her fist when Morris, using a knife, forced Barlow into the car. 
Defendant took Barlow's cell phone from him when Morris took his wallet and keys. 
Defendant joined Morris in threatening Barlow. This sufficed to show robbery — the 
taking of Barlow's property from him against his will by use of force or fear. It also 
sufficed to show aggravated robbery because both Defendant and Morris used 
dangerous weapons. Moreover, the evidence showed aggravated robbery because 
Morris and Defendant took Barlow's operable vehicle in the course of committing 
and fleeing from the robbery. 
The evidence also sufficed to show kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping. 
Defendant tied Barlow's hands while Morris held the knife to him. They then took 
Barlow from the mouth of Ogden Canyon up to Huntsville and beyond to a remote 
location. This sufficed to show that the detention or restraint was for a substantial 
period and thus to show kidnapping. The evidence also sufficed to show 
aggravated kidnapping because both Defendant and Morris possessed and used 
dangerous weapons in committing the kidnapping. 
Finally, even had the evidence been insufficient to show that Defendant 
committed these crimes as a principal, it sufficed to show that she intentionally 
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encouraged and aided Morris in committing the crimes and therefore to support her 
conviction as an accomplice to aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. 
Because the evidence sufficed, the trial court did not plainly err by not sua 
sponte entering a directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence. Moreover, 
because the evidence sufficed, defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving 
for a directed verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has already held that the evidence in this case sufficed to support 
Morris's convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, rejecting 
Morris's plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defendant, raising 
the same claims as Morris did, does not acknowledge this Court's decision in Morris, 
2009 UT App 174U, or reference any evidence that might distinguish her culpability 
from that of Morris. As this Court rejected the claims in Morris's appeal, it should 
reject them here. 
I. 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANTS CONVICTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR, LET ALONE PLAINLY ERR, WHEN IT DID NOT SUA 
SPONTE ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant claims that that the trial court committed plain error when it failed 
to sua sponte "enter a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's 
case for reasons that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction." Br. 
9 
Appellant at 24 (boldface and capitalization omitted). Defendant cannot prevail on 
her plain error claim because she has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the convictions. 
Relevant law. When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a 
motion for directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the party moved against." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, | 7,105 P.3d 951 
(quotation and citation omitted). The Court then "appl[ies] the same standard used 
when reviewing a jury verdict/7 State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 1 41, 70 P.3d 111. 
The trial court's decision will be affirmed if "'some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, f 29,84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted). 
Where no motion for directed verdict is made, but the claim is that the trial 
court plainly erred for not sua sponte directing a verdict, an appellant must show 
"'first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime[s] 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 
1 32, 55 P.3d 1131 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10 P3d 346). 
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A. In its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of aggravated 
robbery had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Elements of robbery and aggravated robbery. To prove robbery, the State 
must prove that a defendant "unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to 
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301.3 
3
 Alternatively, a person commits robbery if "the person intentionally or 
knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation." Id. An act is "in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation" if it occurs "in the course of an 
attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation," "in the commission of theft or 
wrongful appropriation," or "in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission." Id. 
The State also presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably have 
found Defendant guilty of both robbery and aggravated robbery under this 
definition. Defendant wrongfully appropriated cell phone. See R134:176. She also 
wrongfully appropriated Barlow's van. See R134:175-78, 180. Defendant 
intentionally or knowingly used force or fear in the course of committing the 
wrongful appropriations and in the immediate flight after committing the wrongful 
appropriation. See R134:175-80. She brandished a pipe wrench, took and threw out 
Barlow's cell phone, tied Barlow's hands, and threatened him. See R134176-77,180-
81,185. 
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To prove aggravated robbery, the State must, in addition, prove that in the 
course of committing the robbery the person "uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon" or "causes serious bodily injury upon another" or "takes or attempts to 
take an operable motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. A "dangerous 
weapon" is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601. 
Evidence presented. Here, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of robbery had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State presented evidence to meet these elements primarily 
through the testimony of the victim, Barlow. Barlow testified that Defendant took 
the cell phone from him. R134:176-77. He also testified that Morris took his key and 
wallet. R134:176. He testified that Morris used a knife, that Defendant held a pipe 
wrench, and that they both threatened him during the incident. R134:176-77. 
Moreover, while Morris drove, Defendant facilitated the robbery by tying Barlow's 
hands and throwing away the cell phone he might have used to get help. R134:185. 
This evidence sufficed to support a finding that Defendant intentionally took 
personal property from Barlow against his will by means of force or fear and with 
intent to deprive Barlow permanently or temporarily of this property. It is evidence 
sufficient to prove robbery. 
12 
The State also presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that Defendant committed aggravated robbery. Barlow testified that Defendant held 
a pipe wrench during the incident and that Morris held a knife during the entire 
trip. R134:175-85. As explained, Morris used the knife to force Barlow into the van, 
where Barlow was isolated from any passers-by and where Morris could demand 
the wallet and keys. See R134:174-76. Moreover, Morris and Defendant used the 
van to get away after the robbery had been committed. R134:175-76,185,187-88. 
This is evidence that Defendant used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon 
and that she took an operable vehicle during the robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-302. 
B. In its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Elements of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping. To prove kidnapping, 
the State must prove that an "actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of 
law, and against the will of the victim ... detains or restrains the victim for any 
substantial period of time" or "detains or restrains the victim in circumstances 
exposing the victim to risk of bodily injury" or "moves the victim any substantial 
distance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. To prove aggravated kidnapping, the State 
must, in addition, prove that the actor "possesses, uses, or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon" or "acts with intent.... to facilitate the commission, attempted 
13 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony" or "to 
hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony" or "to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302; see also Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-601. 
Evidence presented- Here, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of kidnapping had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Again, the State presented evidence to meet these elements 
primarily through the Barlow's testimony. Barlow testified that Defendant and 
Morris forced him into his van at knifepoint RR134:175-77. Barlow also testified 
that Defendant tied his hands together while Morris held him at knife-point. 
R134:185-86. Barlow further testified that Defendant and Morris transported him 
from the restaurant at the mouth of Ogden Canyon where they first met, R134:169-
71, through Ogden Canyon, R134:177, and past the Huntsville area, R134:181-82. 
While traveling, Morris kept the knife pressed to Barlow's back, R134:178-79. Once 
they reached the area of mile-marker 33.2, Morris ordered Barlow from the vehicle 
and used soldering wire to tie him to a tree some distance off the main road and out 
of sight. R134:183-87. 
During the trip, Defendant continued to threaten Barlow. R134:80. She also 
called Morris "Sarge," assisting in the ruse that Morris was acting in a law 
enforcement capacity. R134:177-78. Further, Defendant threw out Barlow's cell 
14 
phone, making it more difficult for him to get help and thus facilitating both the 
unlawful detention and the flight afterward. R134:81. 
This evidence presented during the State's case-in-chief shows that Morris 
and Defendant"intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against 
the will of the victim ... detain[ed] or restrained] the victim for [a] substantial 
period of time" or "detain[ed] or restrained] the victim in circumstances exposing 
the victim to risk of bodily injury/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. Moreover, these 
acts were "not... slight, inconsequential[,] and merely incidental" to the robbery, 
were not inherent in the nature of the robbery, and had "some significance 
independent of" the robbery in that they made the robbery "substantially easier of 
commission" and "substantially lessen[ed] the risk of detection." State v. Finlayson, 
2000 UT 10, Tf 19, 994 P.2d 1243; cf. State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 34, 128 P.3d 1179 
(dragging victim across the highway sufficient to support kidnapping charge). 
Consequently, the State met its burden to provide evidence for each element of the 
crime of kidnapping. 
In addition, the State presented evidence sufficient to prove aggravated 
kidnapping. The State presented evidence to show that in the course of committing 
the kidnapping Morris possessed and used a knife, a dangerous weapon; that 
Defendant possessed and used a pipe wrench, also a dangerous weapon; and that 
Defendant and Morris committed the kidnapping with the intent to facilitate the 
15 
commission of a robbery and flight after the commission of the robbery. R134:175~ 
86; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. Thus the evidence sufficed to support 
defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping. 
C The evidence was also sufficient to show that Defendant was 
guilty as an accomplice. 
Finally, even assuming the evidence was not sufficient to show that 
Defendant acted as a principal in committing the aggravated robbery or the 
aggravated kidnapping, the evidence sufficed to show that she intentionally aided 
Morris in the commission of these offenses. "Every person acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). 
Here, as this Court has already found, the evidence sufficed to support 
Morris's convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. See 
Morris, 2009 UT App 174U. The evidence also sufficed to show that Defendant 
encouraged and aided Morris in committing those two crimes. Defendant arranged 
for the meeting and the meeting location. See R134:167--69. Defendant introduced 
Morris to Barlow, saying that Morris was her cousin. R134:171-72, After Morris, 
holding a knife to Barlow, forced him into the vehicle, Defendant held up a pipe 
wrench, another means to instill fear of force. See R134:175-77. Defendant 
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threatened Barlow during the incident. R134:180. Defendant referred to Morris as 
"Sarge," thereby joining in Morris's ruse that he was a law enforcement officer. 
R134:176-78. After Morris took Barlow's wallet and keys, Defendant took Barlow's 
cell phone, depriving him of it and making it harder for him to get help or report the 
ongoing crime. R134:176-77. 
This evidence also sufficed to show that Defendant acted with the mental 
state required for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping—i.e., that she 
acted intentionally. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 & 302. Specifically, the evidence 
showed that Defendant knew that Morris was taking Barlow's property and 
transporting him against his will and that, knowing this, she intentionally aided 
Morris. 
Thus, the evidence also sufficed to support Defendant's conviction as an 
accomplice. 
D, Defendant's insufficiency claims are without support. 
In challenging the sufficiency of this evidence, Defendant raises the same 
arguments rejected by this Court in Morris's appeal. Compare Br. Appellant at 21-23 
with Morris, 2009 UT App 174U, f 4. Defendant claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove robbery because no wallet was found, Br. Appellant at 21. But 
Barlow testified that Morris took the wallet from him at knifepoint and that 
Defendant was brandishing a pipe wrench while he did so. R134:175-77. That 
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testimony sufficed to show aggravated robbery. It was not, therefore, necessary to 
show that the investigators recovered the knife, the pipe wrench, or the wallet. 
Defendant also claims that the State failed to prove that she took an operable 
vehicle because Barlow volunteered to drive up the canyon. Br. Appellant at 21. 
Barlow testified that he volunteered to drive up the canyon, but that before he could 
voluntarily begin the drive, Morris pressed a knife against his back, forced him into 
a folding chair inside the van, and took control of the car, driving it to the woods 
where he tied Barlow to the tree and then drove away. R134:174-76,181,185-88. 
That testimony sufficed to show aggravated robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302. Morris, by using his knife, and Defendant, by using the pipe wrench, 
prevented the voluntary drive Barlow had proposed and took Barlow's operable 
vehicle from him. That also sufficed to show aggravated robbery. See id. 
Defendant further claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. Br. Appellant at 24. First, she claims that 
the State did now show that Barlow was detained for any substantial period of time 
or transported any substantial distance or that the circumstances exposed Barlow to 
any risk of bodily injury. Id. But Barlow testified that Morris and Defendant took 
him from the mouth of Ogden Canyon to Huntsville and beyond. R134:l77-85. 
Barlow also testified that Morris left him tied to a tree, alone in the woods. 
R134:185. This testimony sufficed to prove that Morris and Defendant detained 
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Barlow for a substantial period of time, moved him a substantial distance, and 
restrained him in circumstances exposing him to the risk of bodily injury. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Moreover, this was evidence of time and distance that was 
more than "slight, inconsequential[,] and merely incidental to" the robbery and thus 
sufficient to show kidnapping. See Finlayson, 2000 UT10, f 23. 
Defendant also claims that "Barlow volunteered the use of his vehicle and 
voluntarily entered the vehicle for the drive/7 and that the State failed to prove that 
she used a dangerous weapon. Br. Appellant at 23. But, as explained, Barlow 
testified that while he had offered to drive the group in his van, Morris pressed a 
knife into his back as he began to enter the van and threatened him with that knife, 
and Defendant simultaneously threatened him with a pipe wrench. R134:175-76. 
Barlow also testified that Morris took his keys and wallet, Defendant took his 
phone, and Morris and Defendant commandeered the van. R134:175-77. That 
sufficed to show that Barlow was transported against his will and that Morris and 
Defendant each used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon in the course of 
committing the kidnapping. It also sufficed to show that Morris and Defendant 
kidnapped him with the intent to facilitate the commission of and flight after the 
commission of the robbery. It thus sufficed to support Defendant's conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. 
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E, Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, by not sua sponte 
entering a directed verdict 
Defendant cannot prevail on her plain error claim. Defendant has not shown 
that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, let alone "that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/' Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, Tf 32 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
II. 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANTS CONVICTIONS, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID 
NOT PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY FOR NOT REQUESTING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant also claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively for not 
moving for a directed verdict. Br. Appellant at 14-24. 
Relevant law. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
establish both prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which 
holds that such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); see 
also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, counsel is not 
deficient for not making futile motions. Counsel's failure "to make motions or 
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objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance/' 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34, 989 P.2d 52. 
Here, as explained under Point I, the State presented evidence sufficient to 
support a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant cominitted 
aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. Because the evidence sufficed, 
Defendant cannot show that counsel performed deficiently for not moving for a 
directed verdict. Counsel is not required to make futile motions. See id. Moreover, 
because the evidence sufficed, Defendant cannot show that she was prejudiced. She 
cannot show that, had counsel moved for a directed verdict, the court would have 
granted it or that the outcome would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted May _v£, 2010. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEA&I^B. INOUYE 
Assistarl^: Attorney General 
Counsel ijor Appellee 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1 General Provisions 
Section 601 Definitions. 
76-1-60L Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal 
action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
(f) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through 
(h); or 
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if 
committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through 
(i). 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or 
control over tangible property. 
http://le.utah.gov/^code/TITLE76/htm/76_01_060100.htm 5/5/2010 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Amended by Chapter 339, 2007 General Session 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5 Offenses Against the Person 
Section 301 Kidnapping. 
76-5-301. Kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of 
bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent or legal 
guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 14 years of age 
or older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes acting 
without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is a mentally 
incompetent person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
Amended by Chapter 301, 2001 General Session 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5 Offenses Against the Person 
Section 302 Aggravated kidnapping. 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a 
third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular 
conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual 
Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and 
which may be for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of 
fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the 
defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the 
aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual 
offense. 
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a 
lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice 
and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of 
imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_05_030200.htm 5/5/2010 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b): 
(i) 10 years and which may be for life; or 
(ii) six years and which may be for life. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced under 
Subsection (3)(c). 
(6) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-
406. 
Amended by Chapter 339, 2007 General Session 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 301 Robbery. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property 
in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or 
temporarily of the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 302 Aggravated robbery. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or 
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
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PER CURIAM: 
Defendant Brandon Lee Morris appeals his convictions, 
following a jury trial, of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping, both first degree felonies. Defendant argues that 
his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving for a directed 
verdict because it is the general practice of defense counsel in 
any case to move for a directed verdict. Defendant therefore 
argues that "there is simply no reason for trial counsel not to 
move the court for a directed verdict." The relevant inquiry, 
however, is whether there was a basis for counsel to move for a 
directed verdict. Defense counsel would not be ineffective by 
failing to move for a directed verdict if the motion was unlikely 
to be successful. Defendant's alternative claim is that the 
district court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte 
enter a directed verdict after the State rested. 
We generally will not consider an insufficiency of the 
evidence claim "if the defendant has failed to raise it before 
the trial court absent . . . a demonstration by the defendant 
that the trial courr. commitced plain error by submitting the case 
to the jury." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 1 12, 55 P. 3d 
1131. We must first examine "the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict" 
to determine whether "the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crimes for which he or she was convicted." Id. |^ 33 (citation 
and internal quotations omitted). "Only then will we undertake 
an examination of the record to determine 'whether the 
evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was 
plain error to submit the case to the jury.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). 
Defendant essentially claims that the State's evidence was 
insufficient to support an aggravated kidnapping charge because 
it was based largely, but not exclusively, on the victim's 
testimony. Nevertheless, Defendant recounts additional physical 
evidence, including the string attached to a tree, the empty 
solder spool, puncture marks and scratches on the victim, lines 
appearing on the victim's wrists, and the cell phone located 
where the victim indicated it had been thrown. Defendant argues 
that no fingerprints were discovered. He also claims that there 
were discrepancies in the victim's story including discrepancies 
in describing when he was required to give up his wallet and 
questions about how his hands were tied. In rebuttal, the victim 
clarified that although his wrists were tied with a "hoody" 
string, Defendant used a tail from the string to tie him to the 
tree and also used soldering wire to wrap around his wrists and 
then to wrap around the tree. Therefore, the alleged discrepancy 
was resolved. 
Defendant also claims that the evidence indicating he took 
the victim's property is undermined because the victim's wallet 
was not found in Defendant's possession. However, witness Steve 
Stefaniak testified that a friend later found the wallet at the 
campsite where Defendant had been present, but the victim had 
not. Defendant also claims that the State produced no knife as 
the weapon allegedly used in the offense and that there was no 
proof that the marks on the victim were caused by a knife. This 
argument simply discounts the victim's testimony because some 
aspects of it are not supported by physical evidence. Finally, 
Defendant argues that there was no evidence that he took an 
operable motor vehicle because the victim volunteered to drive 
his van. This argument is without merit because the victim 
testified that Defendant took his keys, placed a knife in the 
victim's back while Defendant drove the victim's van, and later 
attempted to drive off in the van after tying the victim to a 
tree. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish the 
elements of aggravated robbery in order to survive a motion for 
directed verdict and support submission of the case to the jury. 
With regard to the aggravated kidnapping count, Defendant argues 
that the State did not prove that Defendant detained or 
restrained the victim for any substantial period of time or 
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exposed him to risk of bodily injury. This argument is without 
merit and again simply discounts the victim's testimony. 
<> 
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to survive a 
motion for directed verdict and the district court did not commit 
plain error because it did not sua sponte direct a verdict 
dismissing the State's case. Similarly, Defendant can 
demonstrate neither deficient performance nor prejudice from 
trial counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict that was 
unlikely to have been granted. Accordingly, we affirm. 
!-fcZ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
/!MtdtA6'?fl*j& 
Caroly: McHugh, Judge1 
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